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Executive Summary
Many studies have estimated the cost of smoking. In recent years, such esti-
mates have been widely used in litigation against the tobacco companies. Both
longitudinal and cross-sectional methods have been used. On balance, the lon-
gitudinal approach, the one used in this study, is much preferable since one can
account for the effects of smoking on the pooi of eligibles rather than just con-
ditioning expenditures on being eligible. We used data from four waves of the
Health and Retirement Study to assess the impact of smoking on use of hospi-
tal and physicians' services and nursing home care. The analysis was limited to
utilization among persons aged 51 to 67 ("near elderly"). During this phase of
the life cycle, many adverse effects of smoking, measured in terms of mortality
and morbidity first occur. In contrast to past studies, we computed the health
expenditure burden of smoking by type of health insurer. The net effect of
smoking on expenditures on health care services was positive for this age co-
hort. We found substantial differences in the burden that smoking imposes on
various payers. The largest impact was on other government payers, which in-
cludes the Veterans Administration, followed by the effects on Medicare and
Medicaid. By contrast, the effects of smoking on private insurers' cost were
negligible.
I.Introduction
Cigarette smoking is the largest single source of preventable mortality
and morbidity in the United States (Bartecchi et al. 1994). In 1990, for
example, about one-fifth of all deaths are attributable to smoking
(MMWR 1993). Effects on morbidity. especially on certain types of can-
cer, heart disease, stroke, and nonmalignant lung disease, have been
documented (Peto 1994).
Several negative externalities are attributable to cigarette smok-
ing and provide the rationale for various forms of public regulation of2 Picone and Sloan
cigarettes. One type of externality is financial. Because of various forms
of insurance, including public health insurance coverage, private
group health insurance, public disability coverage, and public annu-
ities in the form of Social Security benefits, smokers may not pay for
the total cost of harm they cause. Second, environmental smoke may
cause harm to others. Some deleterious effects of environmental smoke
on birth-weight and incidence of cancer have been documented, al-
though as with the first externality, there is ongoing debate about mag-
nitudes of effect (Manning et al. 1989; U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency 1994). In addition, there is the annoyance experienced by non-
smokers in smoky environments, but this cost has not been quantified.
Third, cigarette smoking is highly addictive and the habit is almost al-
ways acquired during childhood (see, for example, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services 2000, p. 121). Under the doctrine of con-
sumer sovereignty, private consumption decisions are ordinarily con-
sidered to be an internal matter and certainly not a source of external
costs. In view of the young age at which this form of addiction is ac-
quired, however, it seems difficult to presume that these are informed
judgments by rational actors, or that the parents of youths would make
decisions consistent with those of their children. In this sense, actions
by tobacco manufacturers to make their products more attractive to
youths may be considered to have external costs, providing still an-
other reason for public regulation. In fact, one group of economists
concluded that these actions by tobacco manufacturers are on balance,
the strongest rationale for such regulation of the three sources of nega-
tive externalities (Warner et al. 1995).
Public regulation of cigarette smoking takes many forms: excise
taxes on cigarettes, restricted availability of cigarettes at the point of
sales, bans restricting where smoking can occur (e.g., in restaurants,
and public buildings), cigarette advertising bans, and imposition of
tort liability on cigarette manufacturers for prior harm caused by
smoking (Hanson and Logue 1998; Jacobson and Warner 1999). Plain-
tiffs' success in litigation against tobacco companies is relatively recent;
that is, this success has taken place since 1992 (Rabin 1993). Probably
the most notable success is the settlement between some tobacco man-
ufacturers and forty-six state attorneys general reached in November
1998. This settlement provided for major indemnity payments by man-
ufacturers as well as an agreement to abide by various restraints on
their behavior, such as in advertising.How Costly Are Smokers to Other People? 3
An important characteristic of smoking is the long latency period be-
tween time of initiation and the onset of adverse effects. Relatively few
adverse health effects occur before a late age. To illustrate, at age 35, the
cumulative probability of survival is the same for those who have
never smoked and smokers. At age 45, the ratio of such probabilities,
those who have never smoked to smokers, is 1.02 for males and 1.00 for
females. At age 55, the corresponding ratios are 1.06 for males and 1.02
for females, and at age 65, the ratios are 1.18 and 1.08. By age 85, the ra-
tios are 2.11 for males and 1.57 for females (Hodgson 1992, p. 91). Ex-
cess morbidity and consequent elevated cost occurs earlier, however,
for some smoking-related diseases such as lung cancer; the lag between
initial treatment and death is less than a year on average (Fry et al.
1999; Ramalingam et al. 1998).
Harm from smoking and the various public interventions to deal
with it are vast topics. The objectives of this study are far more lim-
itedto assess the costs of smoking measured in terms of spending on
personal health care services for a defined age group of individuals,
persons aged 51 to 67, and to estimate the incidence of such costs by
source of payment for health expenditures. Our primary data source
for this study is the first four waves of the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS). This national survey interviewed persons aged 51 to 61 in 1992
and their spouses who could be of any age. By the fourth wave, which
was conducted in 1998, the 61-year-olds were 67.
Our analytical approach represents an improvement over past cost
of smoking studies in the following respects. First, unlike most cost of
smoking studies, especially those done in the United States (Warner
et al. 1999), we used a life-cycle approach. We explain the advantages
of this approach below. Second, the HRS provides longitudinal data on
survival, source of payment for health services, and health services use.
Having data on many relevant covariates allowed for development of a
more accurate life table than has been available previously. Smokers
differ from nonsmokers in many other respects. In this study, we were
able to observe types of heterogeneity not often measured in past work,
e.g., risk preferences (Hersch and Viscusi 1990). Third, since the HRS
provides data on source of payment, we were able to distribute the cost
burden of smoking across payers. No study, to our knowledge, has ex-
plicitly considered the effects of smoking on payer status, nor has one
explicitly incorporated this information in analysis of the cost burden
of smoking. Since smoking decreases health, which in turn influences4 Picone and Sloan
employment status and income and payer status (which in the United
States is employment-related), this issue is an important adjustment to
perform. Fourth, in previous work, it has not been possible to incorpo-
rate changes in smoking status and their effects. In fact, during middle
age, cessation is quite common, and this change should affect the tra-
jectory of health care cost. Fifth, unlike most studies, we did not limit
our analysis to smoking-related diseases. Smoking causes other disease
than the major "smoking-related" diseases. Also, it affects the course of
recovery from various diseases, regardless of whether or not the dis-
eases are "smoking related." The effect of smoking on recovery is com-
plex and does not always work to the disadvantage of smokers (see, for
example, Hasdai et al. 1999).
Our estimates of the increased cost of smoking overall are in line
with estimates from previous studies, especially for the United States.
However, we found appreciable differences in the burden of smoking
cost borne by different health insurers. Thus, if the policy goal is to
compensate for losses incurred as a consequence of smoking, adjust-
ment by payer status is critical for aligning costs incurred with com-
pensatory payments from tobacco companies.
In Section II, we discuss some conceptual issues in measuring the
cost of smoking. Section III reviews the previous literature on smoking
cost. Section IV describes our methodology. In Section V, we present
our findings. Section VI places the findings in a larger context and con-
cludes the study.
II.Conceptual Issues
Choosing the Right Analytical Approach: Life-Cycle Versus
Cross-Sectional Analysis
The cost of personal health services attributable to smoking can be
measured over the life cycle of the smoker or for a single period, such
as a year. Higher medical care use and higher mortality attributable to
smoking have opposite impacts on lifetime expenditures. Higher medi-
cal care use increases lifetime expenditures associated with smoking.
Offsetting this increase, at least in part, is the decrease in survival of
smokers relative to nonsmokers. Medical care use patterns of smokers
and nonsmokers are affected by the various demand determinants, in-
cluding health status, price of health services, state of the underlying
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other factors. None of these factors can be known with any degree of
certainty at the time smoking is initiated. Both mortality and cost per
year are partly affected by cessation, which occurs throughout the life
cycle and, for many individuals, only occurs after a health shock has
been experienced (Ho 1998; Jones 1996; Wray et al. 1998).
During any year, persons who are alive and smoking are potentially
subject to higher expenditures on health care. Most individuals survive
the year, but those near death experience elevated health care expendi-
tures on average (Lubitz and Riley 1993).
In the life-cycle approach (sometimes called the "incidence ap-
proach"), analytically, one needs to document inflowsinsurance pre-
miums and excise taxesand outflowsexcess expenditures on
personal health services. These cash flows are brought to present value
at some base year, say, when the person is a teenager, by discounting.
Premiums do not vary by smoking status. Neither private group insur-
ers nor Medicare varies contributions on this basis. The extent to which
individual insurers vary premiums is unknown. Outflows, both those
borne by individuals out-of-pocket and others, vary systematically by
smoking status.
In analyzing a particular cross-section (sometimes called the "preva-
lence approach"), the researcher typically finds a smoking-attributable
fraction (SAF), that is, the increase in expenditures on personal health
services attributable to smoking. Typically, in obtaining the SAF, ex-
planatory variables other than those for smoking behavior are included
to control for other determinants of spending. The SAF is then applied
to other data on expenditures, such as for Medicaid in a given state in a
particular year, to derive the cost of smoking to that payer.
The cross-sectional approach has one major advantage. It is simpler
to implement because, to obtain the SAF, one needs only a single
cross-section on individuals with data on expenditures and determi-
nants of such expenditures, including smoking behavior. The SAF is
then readily applied to publicly available data bases from insurers.
The cross-sectional approach, however, has one important flaw. Out-
lays from a payer, for example, Medicaid, depend on the number of
enrollees and outlays per enrollee. To the extent that smoking results
in premature deaths of persons who would otherwise have been en-
rollees, expenditures are correspondingly diminished. Also, even
for persons who survive, persons change insurers. The cost of smok-
ing may have more to do with numbers of people enrolled in a particu-
lar program than with spending attributable to smoking, conditional6 Picone and Sloan
on the number of persons covered by the program. The life-cycle
method conceptually links the cause (smoking) with the effect (future
medical expense) much more directly (see, for example, Miller et al.
1997).
From the standpoint of setting the charge on potential insurers to
achieve optimal deterrence by some form of ex ante regulation, includ-
ing imposing excise taxes on cigarettes, the life-cycle approach is pref-
erable. This approach allows one to identify the cash flows associated
with another person starting the habit and the cash flows from quitting
or continuing to smoke but reducing one's level of cigarette consump-
tion. One can compute the benefit from a particular action to discour-
age initiation and encourage cessation, which certainly has con-
sequences over several years, and set cigarette excise taxes, adjust
insurance premiums, or impose penalties per smoker on manufactur-
ers according to the quantitative estimates of harm attributable to the
activity.
Risk Classification
For purposes of developing an actuarially fair premium to reflect the
added external cost of smoking, itis necessary to answer the
counterfactual question: What cost would a nonsmoking person with
smoker-like characteristics impose? For purposes of establishing an
actuarially fair premium for insurance purposes, just knowing that the
person is a smoker or not might be sufficient to achieve some character-
istics of an optimal risk classification system, such as separation in ex-
pected loss (see Abraham 1986), but risk classes should also provide
loss prevention incentives. To craft an adequate disincentive to smoke,
one must reward but not under- or overreward such behavior. Demo-
graphic characteristics affect medical spending levels and are corre-
lated with smoking. To the extent that smokers differ on demographic
characteristics that are clearly exogenous to the smoking decision, ad-
justment is straightforward. Also, individual tastes, for example, risk
preferences, may not be affected by smoking status.
On the other hand, how other health behaviors, such as diet, exer-
cise, and alcohol use, are properly treated in the analysis is more con-
troversial. Such activities may be complements or substitutes for
smoking: complements if persons who smoke are also inactive, per-
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amounts of alcohol; substitutes if reductions in smoking lead to offset-
ting increases in other unhealthy behaviors. One should gauge the sen-
sitivity of estimates effects of smoking on cost, controlling and not
controlling for these other activities.
Another issue is whether the comparison group is between current
smokers and those who have never smoked or between smokers and
some category of former smokers. The appropriate choice depends on
the question being asked. Comparing current and former smokers
would be relevant for assessing benefits of smoking cessation interven-
tions, but not for assessing benefits of preventing initiation for which
those who have never smoked are the appropriate reference group.
III.Previous Studies
Life-Cycle Approach
Empirical implementation of the life-cycle approach is illustrated by a
recent article by Barendregt et al. (1997), which applied the approach
for the Netherlands. For their calculations, the authors used data on
age- and gender-specific incidence and prevalence of five major dis-
eases: heart disease, stroke, lung cancer, a heterogeneous group of
other cancers, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD).
They obtained data on the per capita cost of each of these diseases. The
residual category was all other diseases, which accounted for the dif-
ference between total costs of health care and the cost of the five dis-
eases, expressed per capita population. Unlike the fivediseases,
frequency of the residual disease category varied by age and gender,
but not by smoking status. The authors used three life tables: one for a
mixed population of smokers and nonsmokers, one for a population of
smokers, and one for a population of nonsmokers. Expected cost was
discounted at alternative rates, ranging from 0 to 10 percent.
Per capita costs rose sharply with age, increasing tenfold between
the base age 40 to 44 years of age to 85 to 89 years of age. At age 65 to
74, per capita cost was 40 percent higher for male smokers and 25 per-
cent higher for female smokers. However, considering the number of
smokers alive by age, the total cost of care for various age cohorts of
male smokers peaked to about age 65 to 69. For male nonsmokers, the
total cost of care peaked about age 75 to 79. Far more (over three times)
was spent on behalf of male nonsmokers aged 85 to 89 than onmale8 Picone and Sloan
smokers of the same age. The authors simulated changes in total health
costs for the male population after smoking cessation. Regardless of
the discount rate used, smoking cessation caused an initial drop in
spending. As the population aged, however, spending increased. Thus,
for example, using the most plausible discount rate of 3 percent,
thirty-one years after cessation, encouraging people to stop smoking
actually increased spending. Using a lower discount rate decreased the
breakeven year; with a higher rate, the breakeven year was greater
than thirty-one years.
Other longitudinal studies have yielded different results. Several
studies have found smoking to result in higher medical cost, but the
amount of the increase depended on the discount rate used and other
underlying assumptions (Oster et al. 1984; Leu and Schaub 1985;
Manning et al. 1991; Hodgson 1992). Leu and Schaub (1985), a study of
Swiss males, found higher expenditures for nonsmokers than smokers,
a result consistent with the study from the Netherlands. According to
Miller et al. (1997), however, "There is some evidence that Leu and
Schaub underestimated the level of excess medical care associated with
smokers" (p. 5).
The prevalence approach has been widely used in studies by experts
for plaintiffs in tobacco litigation (see, for example, Harris 1997; Max
1997). The general methodology is to derive smoking-attributable frac-
tions for particular health services, such as for hospital care, and apply
these fractions to data on expenditures. The smoking-attributable frac-
tions consistently imply excess spending on behalf of smokers (see, for
example, Miller et al. 1997, 1999) and therefore are favorable to plain-
tiffs in such litigation. Thus, smoking-related cost is always positive as
well. These studies have been criticized by experts for the defense on
grounds that they underadjust for behaviors other than smoking and
fail to account for premature death due to smoking (see, for example,
Rubin 1997). Quoting Viscusi (1999), "There are no damages to the state
in terms of higher Medicaid costs once smokers are dead" (p. 590).
Several studies have extended analysis of the consequences of smok-
ing to include a larger number of types of costssick leave, group life
insurance, retirement pensions, and fire (see, in particular, Atkinson
and Townsend 1977; Manning et al. 1989, 1991; Viscusi 1995, 1999). The
largest addition to cost from smoking is medical care cost, excluding
cost of nursing home care. The largest savings from smoking are in
terms of reduced pension cost and in the cost of nursing home care.How Costly Are Smokers to Other People? 9
IV.Methods and Empirical Specification
The HRS was conducted in two-year intervals. We defined explanatory
variables for the preceding wave. Thus, utilization of health care ser-
vices between the waves was made to depend on levels of variables in
the previous wave. For this reason, our panel used Waves 2 to 4, with
Wave 1 used exclusively for information on explanatory variables.
Our measures of personal health services were the number of nights
in the hospital, number of visits to physicians, and whether or not the
person was admitted to a nursing home during the two yearsbefore
the survey. In this age cohort, very few persons are admitted to nursing
homes.
The key explanatory variables relate to smoking behavior. We
defined binary variables for current smokers, former smokers who quit
smoking from five to ten, eleven to nineteen, and twenty or more years
before the preceding interview with those who have never smoked, the
omitted reference group. We combined persons who quit less than five
years before the preceding interview with currentsmokers because (1)
such persons are much more likely to relapse and (2) short-term quit-
ting is often motivated by an adverse health event. As stressed by
Moore and Hughes (2001) in Chapter 2 of this volume, recent quitting
may reflect occurrence of recent health shocks. In fact, in preliminary
analysis, we found that persons who quit smoking in the past five
years were higher utilizers of medical care services on averagethan
were current smokers.
Other explanatory variables were either time-varying or time-invari-
ant. Time-varying explanatory variables were household income, mari-
tal status, self-reported health, body mass index (for height in
relationship to weight), and insurance status. The insurance categories
were Medicare disabled, Medicare elderly, Medicaid, other govern-
ment, private individual, and private group coverage. Some sample
persons had more than one type of coverage. We distinguishedbe-
tween Medicare disabled and elderly based on the person's age. If un-
der age 65 at the interview, the Medicare enrollee was classified in the
former group. To develop mutually exclusive health insurance catego-
ries, we developed a hierarchy of types. For example, if a person had
both Medicare and Medicaid, we considered the person to be covered
by Medicare. A person was considered to be uninsured only if she or he
had no other source of coverage.10 Picone and Sloan
Time-invariant variables were alcohol consumption, including
self-identified problem drinkers; a risk tolerance measure (see Barsky
et al. 1997); gender; education; and race. We also included a variable for
year and age, which varied by wave.
To assess the effect of smoking behavior on numbers of hospital
nights and physician visits, we estimated a random effects negative bi-
nomial model (Hausman et al. 1984). A random effects negative bino-
mial has several appealing features. First, it deals explicitly with count
data. Second, it allows for inclusion of covariates. Third, it accounts for
the large proportion of zeros in our utilization measures and the
skewed distribution of positive values. Fourth, it allows for overdisper-
sion (variance greater than the mean), unlike the Poisson model. Fifth,
it takes advantage of the panel feature of our data by accounting for
persistent individual random effects. To gauge effects of smoking on
nursing home use, we estimated a random effect logit model.
Using data on mortality between Waves 1 and 2, we estimated logit
models for males and females to analyze determinants of survival, par-
ticularly, the effects of smoking. We used the same explanatory vari-
ables used to assess determinants of utilization. All such variables were
measured at Wave 1. With parameter estimates from these models, we
constructed life tables for current smokers, former smokers, nonsmok-
ing smokers, nonsmoking former smokers, and those who have never
smoked. A nonsmoking smoker is a person with the characteristics of
smokers except that the person does not smoke.
We created thirteen categories for thirteen representative individu-
als: current smoker; former smoker who quit (1) two years ago, (2)
seven years ago, (3) thirteen years ago, (4) eighteen years ago, and (5)
twenty-three years ago; those who have never smoked; nonsmoking
smoker; and five nonsmoking former smokers. The total number of
hospital nights and physician visits for persons between the ages of 51
and 67 were estimated as follows. First, we created life tables for
fifty-one-year-old male and female representative individuals based on
estimates from the hazard models. Second, we created eight two-year
periods. Third, for each period, we simulated survival for each period.
Fourth, using coefficients from the negative binomial model, we simu-
lated the number of hospital nights and physician visits that a repre-
sentative individual had in that period. If, according to the simulation,
the individual survived the period, we used this simulated amount for
health services utilization. But if the individual died during the period,
we assumed that the person used 3.5 times as much care. Fifth, if the in-How Costly Are Smokers to Other People? 11
dividual was predicted to have died, this utilization level was final. If
the individual was predicted to have survived, we updated the charac-
teristics of the representative individuals by (1) updating the period (to
account for trends in medical utilization), (2) updating the numberof
years since quitting for former smokers, and (3)forcing 10 percent of
the current smokers to become former smokers. We did not allow for
relapsing, but relapsing was uncommon in our sample, especially after
smokers had quit for several years. Sixth, we repeated the fourth and
fifth steps until the individual was predicted to die or the eighth period
was reached.
We used alternative discount rates of 0 and 3 percent. We simulated
utilization for 1,000 representative smokers, smokers who had never
smoked, and those who had never smoked 100 times. We computed
means from each sample of 1,000 representativeindividuals and report
the means and standard deviations based on the 100 samples.
Finally, to study effects of smoking on insurance status, we estimated
a multinomial logit model. Mutually exclusivecategories for the de-
pendent variable were being uninsured, covered by Medicare, covered
by Medicaid, having other public coverage, or private individual cov-
erage. The omitted reference group wasprivate group coverage. We
used the same explanatory variables as in the previous multivariate
analyses (except, of course, insurance status). All variables were mea-
sured for Wave 1.
Simulated changes in utilization for all individuals were obtained in
the following way. First, we calculated the weighted average of utiliza-
tion of smokers; former smokers who quit two, seven, thirteen, eigh-
teen, and twenty-three years ago, and those who had neversmoked.
Second, we calculated the weighted average of utilization for non-
smoking smokers, nonsmoking former smokers who quit two, seven,
thirteen, eighteen, and twenty-three years ago, and those who had
never smoked. Third, we calculated the percentagedifference between
the two amounts. To calculate simulated changes in utilization for each
payer, we adjusted the weights based onthe likelihood of each individ-
ual using a particular payer.
The likelihood of each individual using a particular payer was calcu-
lated from the predicted probabilities of the multinomial choice model
described above. For the counterfactual, nonsmoking smokers, we cal-
culated these probabilities, switching the smoking variable off (that is,
setting the binary equal to zero), but holding all other characteristicsof
that individual constant.12 Picone and Sloan
To translate utilization differences in cost to each payer, we used data
on cost per hospital day (U.S. Department of Commerce 1999, Table
203), adjusted for price-cost margins paid by each payer (U.S. Prospec-
tive Payment Assessment Commission 1995,p. 21) and prices per phy-
sician encounter (U.S. Department of Commerce 1999, Tables 184 and
198), and also adjusted for payer payment differentials (U.S. Physician
Payment Review Commission 1995,pp. 77-84).
V.Results
Longitudinal Smoking Patterns
Once a person quit smoking, restarting was relatively unusual (table
1.1). Among persons who reported smoking at Wave 1, the propensity
to smoke at subsequent waves fell monotonically. At Wave 2, 83 per-
cent continued to smoke, but at Wave 3, only 79 percent of Wave 1 cur-
rent smokers did. By Wave 4, only 70 percent of these individuals said
they were current smokers. Among persons who said that they quit be-
tween one to four years before the Wave 1 interview, nearly 6 percent
had restarted by Wave 2; the proportion of these persons who restarted
by Waves 3 and 4 were even higher. Thus, for a nontrivial subset of
such individuals, not smoking at Wave 1 was only temporary. For this
reason, in our empirical analysis, we combined current smokers and
those who had quit within five years of the interview into a single cate-
gory for our analysis of mortality, utilization of personal health care
services, and choice of health insurance type.
Between 2 and 3 percent of persons who had quit for five to nine
years at the baseline survey resumed smoking subsequently. For for-
mer smokers who had quit ten to nineteen years earlier, had quit
twenty years earlier, or had never smoked, restarting occurred in 1 per-
cent or less of cases. Overall the percentage of smokers declined from
28 percent in Wave 1 to slightly less than 20 percent by Wave 4 (figure
1.1). In part, the decline reflected higher mortality rates among smok-
ers, but most of the change is attributable to high smoking cessation
rates among persons in this age cohort.
Health Insurance
Sources of payment for personal health insurance shifted dramatically
over the six-year period, probably more so than is typical for other age0
Wave
Figure 1.1
Current smokers by wave
cohorts (table 1.2). For the sample as a whole, the single largest primary
source of health insurance was private group insurance.Between
Waves 1 and 4, however, the percentage of persons with such coverage
dropped from 65 to 48 percent. By Wave 4, Medicare was the second
most important payer, consisting of about three-quarters of personseli-
gible for Medicare based on age, with the remainder eligible based on
disability. Only between 3 to 4 percent of persons in this age group had
Medicaid as the primary source of health insurance. Less than 10 per-
cent had individual private health insurance coverage. At Wave 1,
nearly 17 percent of persons had no health insurance; by Wave 4, only
10 percent of persons fell in this category. The decrease in uninsuredin-
dividuals was primarily caused by persons becoming age-eligible for
Medicare.
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Table 1.1
Current smokers at Waves 2 to 4 conditional on smoking status at Wave I (%)
Smoking variable Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
Current 83.25 78.58 69.82
Former ito 4 years 5.78 7.41 7.61
Former 5 to 9 years 2.26 2.69 2.24
Former 10 to 19 years i.36 1.21 1.32
Former more than 20 0.79 1.04 0.90
Never 0.59 0.37 0.36
N 8535.00 7803.00 7198.00
1 3 4At Wave 1, 28 percent of persons smoked or had quit within five
years of the interview (table 1.3). Such persons were overrepresented
among the uninsured, accounting for 36 percent of the uninsured. They
also accounted for more than their share of Medicare disabled,
Medicaid, and other public programs. They were underrepresented
among the privately insured, both for group and individual coverage.
Although the percentages differed at Wave 4, the conclusion that smok-
ers are disproportionately covered by public programs and are unin-
sured did not change. However, smokers were underrepresented
among the elderly on Medicare (persons between 65 and 67).
Those who had never smoked comprised 37 percent of the sample at
Wave 1 and 38 percent at Wave 4. Relative to the total sample, these
persons were more likely to have individual health insurance coverage
and less likely to have coverage from government programs other than
Medicare or Medicaid.
Adjusting for the influence of other factors using multinomial logit
analysis of data from Wave 1 did not alter these findings (table 1.4).
Current smokers were more likely to have been uninsured or have
various forms of government insurance. They were least likely to have
private individual insurance, although the difference between this cat-
egory and private group coverage, the omitted reference group, was
not statistically significant at conventional levels. Gauged in terms
of differences in probabilities predicted from this model, current smok-
ers were 0.0009 more likely to be uninsured; 0.010, 0.0003, and 0.030
more likely to be on Medicare, Medicaid, or have other government
coverage, respectively; and 0.006 less likely to have private individual
14 Picone and Sloan
Table 1.2
Health insurer by Wave (%)
Insurer Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
Uninsured 16.57 13.11 11.83 9.83
Medicare disabled 3.93 5.76 7.85 7.54
Medicare elderly 0.00 0.00 4.14 18.43
Medicaid 3.37 3.68 3.76 3.11
Other government 5.61 5.33 4.85 4.30
Group insurance 65.41 65.87 57.96 48.17
Individual insurance 5.12 6.24 9.60 8.62

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































316 Picone and Sloan
Table 1.4
Effects of smoking on health insurance coverage at Wave 1: results from multinomial
logit analysisd
a Significant at the 1% level (two-tail test).
b Significant at the 5% level (two-tailtest).
Significant at the 10% level (two-tail test).
d t-ratio in parentheses;marginal effects in brackets.
coverage than were those who had never smoked. Although these dif-
ferences in probability appear to be small, they are sometimes large rel-
ative to the proportion of persons in the age cohort with the type of
coverage, such as for other government insurance coverage that under-
lies the large effect of smoking for this payer category (to be discussed
below).
The difference in the probability of having private group coverage
(not shown in table 1.4) was 0.049, implying that current smokerswere
less likely to have group insurance than was the case for those who had
never smoked. Although those who had never smoked were less likely
to have been uninsured than were current smokers, they were more
likely to be uninsured than were persons who had quit, especiallyper-
sons who had quit twenty or more years before the Wave 1 interview.
Many other parameter estimates, not shown in the table, were plau-
sible. For example, risk averse persons were more likely to havesome
form of health insurance, a result previously reported by Barsky et al.
(1997). Older persons were more likely to be uninsuredor have public
insurance, including Medicare. Since the analysis was based on
Wave 1, none of the respondents had become age eligible for Medicare.
Other
Smoking variableUninsuredMedicareMedicaidgovernmentIndividual
Current + former, 0.083 0372b 0.230 0.624a -0.05
1 to4years (1.07) (2.50) (1.42) (5.01) (-0.48)
[0.0009][0.010] [0.003] [0.0301 [-0.006]
Former, 5 to -0.124 0.451c 0.324 0.372c _0.42c
9 years (-0.848) (1.87) (1.16) (1.75) (-1.64)
[-0.021] [0.0161 [0.0091 [0.0171 [-0.018]
Former, 10 to -0.159 0.354c 0.159 0.523a -0.062
19 years (-1.26) (1.64) (0.614) (3.13) (-0.33)
[-0.026] [0.012] [0.004] [0.026] [-0.004]
Former, more -1.550 0.304 0.552 0.242 0.101
than 20 (-1.36) (1.50) (1.68) (1.52) (0.65)
[-0.0201 [0.0121 [-0.0111 [0.0111 [-0.005]How Costly Are Smokers to Other People? 17
Older persons within the age cohort were least likely to have private
group coverage.
Utilization of Personal Health Care Services
We measured the impact of smoking on utilization of health services,
controlling and not controlling for self-reported health. In general, the
results were quite similar, and we report only results without these
controls because not controlling for self-reported health is more con-
ceptually appropriate. (To the extent that smoking affects self-reported
health, one should not control for this factor.)
For hospital care, effects of smoking status on use were positive for
current and for all of the former smoking categories (table 1.5). Current
smokers had the highest rates of use, with a relative risk of 1.29, fol-
lowed by persons who had quit for five to nine years at the prior wave,
with a relative risk of 1.21; the influence of smoking was less for those
who had quit ten to nineteen years before the prior wave, with a rela-
tive risk of 1.14. The relative risk for persons who had quit twenty or
more years previously was essentially the same as for those whohad
never smoked, the omitted reference group.
Other relationships, not presented, were plausible. For example, use
by the uninsured was the lowest, other factors being equal, and use by
Medicare beneficiaries was the highest, holding age and other factors
constant. In general, privately insured individuals had lower rates of
hospital use than did those with public insurance.
For number of visits, the effect of smoking status on use was less
clear. Current smokers had essentially the same rates of use as those
who had never smoked. By contrast, those who quit from five to nine
years and ten to nineteen years before the interview sawphysicians
more often than did those who had never smoked. The relative risk for
both groups of quitters was 1.13. When we controlled for self-reported
health (not shown), the differential in visit rates between current smok-
ers and those who had never smoked was even larger, and thisdiffer-
ence was statistically significant at better than the 5 percentlevel. We
prefer the specification without self-reported health because health is
itself affected by smoking. We controlled for many other factors, in-
cluding type of health insurance, education, income, and degree of risk
aversion. Results for most of the other explanatory variables were
plausible.
In this age cohort, being in a nursing home is a rare event. Although
the number of respondents spending time in a nursing home increased18 Picone and Sloan
Table 1.5
Effects of smoking on utilization of personal health services: results from random effects
negative binomial and logit analysis
a Significant at the 1% level (two-tail test).
b Significantat the 5% level (two-tail test).
Significant at the 10% level (two-tail test).
for each of the waves, the number was very low: Wave 1-11, Wave
2-14, Wave 3-21, Wave 4-25. Among the users, the overwhelming
majority of persons stayed in the nursing home for a month or less,
suggesting that most of this utilization was for post-hospital stays.
Thus, in our logit analysis of nursing home use, we distinguished only
between users and nonusers. Even with this very small sample of us-
ers, the coefficient on current users was positive and statistically
significant at the 10.3 percent level. Coefficients for the former smokers
were also positive, although statistically significant at lower levels than
the 10.3 level. Including self-reported health only had a slight influence
on the estimated parameters. For all of the categories of current and
former smokers, the odds ratios well exceeded 1.0, suggesting that,
with more statistical power, statistically significant relationships may
have been obtained.
Not surprisingly (results not shown), given the distribution of length
of stay, having Medicare increased the number of nights in a nursing
home; by contrast, being on Medicaid had no effect.
Mortality
Current smokers have a much higher rate of death than those who had
never smoked (table 1.6). For males, the hazard ratio was 3.59 and for
females, 1.89; both parameter estimates were statistically significant.
For males, hazard ratios for former smokers who quit five to nine years
before the interview were around 3.48; for those who quit ten to nine-
teen years earlier, 2.06; and for persons who had quit more than twenty
Smoking variable
Hospital nights Physician visits Nursing home
Relative risk Relative riskt Relative risk
Current + former ito 1.29a 6.440.98 0.806 i.87c 1.63
4 years
Former, 5 to 9 yearsi.2i 2.941.13 4.231.40 0.52
Former, 10 to 19 yearsi.i4' 2.45i.i3 4.382.13 1.53
Former, more than 200.92 1.351.02 1.621.78 1.18How Costly Are Smokers to Other People? 19
Table 1.6
Effects of smoking on mortality
a Significant at the 1% level (two-tail test).
b Significant at the 5% level (two-tail test).
Significant at the 10% level (two-tail test).
years earlier, the hazard ratio was 1.59, but not statistically significant
at conventional levels. For females, hazard ratios were consistently
lower than for males and, except for current smokers, not statistically
significant. Effects of smoking were quite robust to changes in equation
specification.
Other results (not shown) were generally plausible. For males, the
following variables had statistically significant and positive impacts on
deathsage, being on Medicare, being on Medicaid, and one of the
measures of heavy drinking at the baseline interview. Being married re-
duced the probability of dying. Risk preferences had no impact on
mortality. Not accounting for risk preferences has been a criticism of
studies used by plaintiffs in tort litigation (see, for example, Hersch
and Viscusi, 1990, for specific evidence on the link between smoking
and other risky behaviors). For females, only age and being on
Medicaid (other than being a current smoker) had positive and statisti-
cally significant effects on mortality at the 5 percent level or better.
Based on these coefficients, we created life tables for all our smoking
categories. For the overall sample, our life tables produced very similar
hazard rates to those constructed for the total population in 1997 by the
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (1999). For example,
for males, our life table yielded a 1.28 hazard rate for two years at 51
and 4.39 at 65. The CDC life table yielded rates of 1.27 and 4.38,
respectively.
Simulated Utilization by Smoking Status
Male Female
Smoking variable Relative risk t Relative risk
Current + former ito 4 years 359a
Former,5to9years 348b
Former, 10 to 19 years 2.06
Former, more than 20 1.59
Simulated utilization by nonsmoking current smokers was far more
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Table 1.7
Simulated utilization for sixteen years for person age 51 by smoking status
reflecting that the other characteristics had only a minor impact on uti-
lization relative to the effect of being a smoker (table 1.7). The same pat-
tern resulted for former smokers. The effect of being a former smoker
was far greater than the effect on utilization of the characteristics of for-
mer smokers versus those of people who had never smoked. By charac-
teristics, we include characteristics affecting both utilization and
mortality.
We show utilization for the sixteen-year period discounted at
3 percent. We also simulated utilization using a zero discount rate
(not shown). Discounting has the effect of decreasing the utilization
Male Female
Smoking status Hospital nights Physician visits Hospital nights Physician visits
11.82 56.69 10.59 72.33
Current smokers (0.56) (1.05) (0.52) (1.10)
Former smoker
Quit 2 years ago10.73 60.91 9.92 78.42
(0.49) (1.00) (0.44) (0.99)
Quit 7 years ago10.03 62.39 9.14 80.46
(0.44) (1.05) (0.39) (1.19)
Quit 13 years ago9.17 61.41 8.20 78.24
(0.40) (0.95) (0.38) (1.09)
Quit 18 years ago8.41 59.99 7.38 76.31
(0.42) (0.88) (0.40) (1.01)
Quit 23 years ago8.16 59.81 7.16 75.69
(0.42) (0.76) (0.35) (0.97)
Those who have 8.65 57.29 7.93 71.62
never smoked (0.38) (0.81) (0.37) (1.00)
Nonsmoking
Current 9.52 56.83 8.53 71.34
(0.43) (0.75) (0.48) (0.93)
Quit 2 years ago9.18 56.98 8.46 72.30
(0.42) (0.97) (0.41) (0.97)
Quit 7 years ago9.03 57.24 8.29 72.44
(0.44) (0.97) (0.40) (1.14)
Quit 13 years ago8.86 57.25 7.96 71.68
(0.40) (0.85) (0.42) (0.93)
Quit 18 years ago8.78 57.27 7.82 71.06
(0.42) (0.87) (0.42) (1.02)
Quit 23 years ago8.75 57.31 7.69 71.03
(0.39) (0.78) (0.37) (1.09)How Costly Are Smokers to Other People? 21
differences. With discounting at 3 percent, male current smokers were
predicted to have 2.3 additional nights in the hospital over the six-
teen-year period relative to nonsmoking current smokers, a 24.1 per-
cent increase, and 3.17 nights relative to those who had never smoked,
a 36.6 percent increase. For females, the correspondingdifferentials at a
3 percent discount were 2.06 nights, or 24.1 percent, and 2.66, or 33.5
percent, respectively.
Being a former smoker decreased the number of hospital nights rela-
tive to current smokers. As the period of quitting increased, the differ-
ence between hospitalization of former smokers and thosewho had
never smoked decreased. For male former smokerswho quit eighteen
and twenty-three years before the interview, use was even lower than
for those who had never smoked. For female former smoking, the com-
parison between former smokers and those who had never smoked
was relatively more favorable for former smokers than for males.For
some categories, the nonsmoking former smoker adjustmentboosts
hospital utilization.
The pattern for physician visits is more complex. Utilization over
the sixteen-year period was simulated to be lower for male current
smokers than for those who had never smoked: 56.69 versus 57.29, or
1 percent lower. Physician visits by male nonsmoking current smok-
ers was 56.83; visit rates among current smokers are 0.2 percentlower
than this group. Female use of physician services was uniformly higher
than for males. For females, the differential between current smokers
and those who had never smoked was 0.7 visits, or 0.9 percent. Be-
tween current and nonsmoking current smokers, the difference was
greater: one visit, or 1.3 percent. This finding implies that smokers'
characteristics per se decrease demand for physician services. For fe-
males, former smokers uniformly had more physician visits compared
to those who had never smoked.
Simulated Utilization by Payer
Overall, for males, smoking and having smoked in the past increased
hospital utilization and the number of physician visits over the six-
teen-year period, starting at age 51, by 8.72 and 2.29 percent, respec-
tively (table 1.8). For females, the corresponding increases were 7.49
and 2.42 percent, respectively. These percentage estimates reflect mor-
tality, utilization, and cessation propensities. These differentials com-
pare smoking patterns as of the HRS interviewswith a world in which
no one smoked.22 Picone and Sloan
Table 1.8
Percentage simulated changes in utilization by payer
The differences by payer are striking. The largest differentials were
for the other government group, which includes Champus and the Vet-
erans Administration. For males, smoking caused a 55.39 percent in-
crease in hospital use and a 43.38 percent increase in physician visit
rates. The hospital differential was about half this for Medicare while,
for physicians' services, the differential for Medicare is 12.73 percent.
For males on Medicaid, the differentials were somewhat less, but still
sizable: 22.16 percent for hospital use and 8.83 percent for physician
visits. By comparison, private payers incurred little loss from smoking
or even benefit. This finding was particularly true of private individual
insurance. For females, patterns were the same qualitatively but with
differences in details.
Simulated changes in utilization were based on predicted payer
status from the multinomial logit analysis using data from Wave 1 (ta-
ble 1.8). There were two assumptions underlying the calculations. First,
we assumed that persons stayed with the payer they had initially. In
fact, many switched to Medicare at age 65. Thus, the burden on
Medicare was somewhat understated and the burden on other payers,
such as Medicaid, slightly overstated but nevertheless substantial. The
second assumption was that our counterf actual nonsmoking smokers'
choice of insurance could be accurately predicted from the multinomial
logit, holding all other characteristics constant, except for the smoking
variables. The large difference in incidence by payer was due to the fact
that smokers were more likely to have health insurance from public
sources.
Male Female
Hospital Physician Hospital Physician
Payer nights visits nights visits
Uninsured 1.94 -6.30 8.33 1.54
Medicare 27.18 12.73 32.76 24.29
Medicaid 22.16 8.83 17.03 8.29
Other government 55.39 43.38 45.50 35.82
Group insurance 4.54 -0.62 4.94 0.79
Individual insurance 0.25 -4.63 1.68 -2.49
All individuals 8.72 2.29 7.49 2.42Cost of Smoking by Payer
For males, smoking increased by 6.4 percent in the aggregate (table
1.9). The corresponding estimate for females was 5.2 percent. As with
utilization, the large impact was for other government, followed by
Medicare and Medicaid. Effects of the privately insured and the unin-
sured were negligible. We obtained no consistent relationship between
the estimated impacts for males as contrasted with females. For other
government, the males' effect was higher; women were half as likely to
be covered by other government insurance as were men. Thus, the im-
pact for this group was fairly imprecise. For Medicare, the cost impact
was higher for women than men, and the reverse was truefor
Medicaid.
VI.Discussion and Conclusions
For this age group, smoking increased medical utilization and dollar
outlays by 5 to 8 percent on average, with substantial variation in inci-
dence by payer. Public payers bore a disproportionate burden. This in-
crease was net of various offsets for mortality andsmoking cessation.
Accounting for the effects of smoking on payer choice is critical to ac-
curate accounting of smoking-attributable costs.
Severe limitations of this study should be noted. First, we did not
study the effects of smoking cessation on medical spending. Rather,
our objective was to measure the health expenditureburden that smok-
ing imposes. Although we "switched off" smoking to compute the bur-
den of smoking, our estimates do not represent the savings that would
How Costly Are Smokers to Other People?
Table 1.9






Other government 51.23 41.39
Group insurance 2.73 3.16
Individual insurance 1.45 0.10
All individuals 6.38 5.2424 Picone and Sloan
be realized if current smokers were to quit. For such individuals, much
(but not all) of the damage has been done, whether or not they quit.
Second, our findings showing that public insurers bear a dispropor-
tionate share of the cost reflect the result that smokers were more likely
to be covered by Medicare, Medicaid, and other government payers
than were former smokers and those who had never smoked in thisage
cohort. Our methodology was based on the assumption that smoking
causes increased government coverages. This assumption is plausibly
the case for Medicare and Medicaid. Persons below age 65 only become
eligible for Medicare for reasons of serious disability, although we can-
not determine the fraction of cases of disability attributable to smoking
or to some other cause. And serious illness and disability generally de-
termines enrollment in Medicaid as well. Medicaid imposes stringent
asset and income eligibility screens. A study using data on younger
individuals that controlled for several other factors, including native
intelligence, found that smoking reduced wages by roughly 5 to
8 percent (Levine et al. 1997). In our analysis, we controlled for house-
hold income, but not income accruing to the household member.
Household income is the concept used by Medicaid for purposes of es-
tablishing eligibility, but a low-wage individual in this age cohort
would have been more likely to leave the labor force and, holding fam-
ily income constant, become eligible for Medicaid. In our analysis of ef-
fects of smoking, we also controlled for several other determinants of
health insurance coverage, including education, marital status, gender
(see, for example, Currie and Yelowitz 1999), race, problem drinking,
body mass index, and risk tolerance, but not for native intelligence or
cognition. Thus, we did account for many socioeconomic factors that
are plausibly correlated with type of insurance coverage and smoking
status.
For veterans' and military health insurance coverage, the situation is
more complex. Historically, the U.S. military has greatly encouraged
smoking by selling low-price cigarettes to soldiers (Tate 1999). For this
and other reasons, including peer effects and lack of information on the
deleterious health effects of smoking, many men in the military
smoked, certainly in the age cohort we studied. In this sense, the fact
that the U.S. government is bearing an extra burden attributable to
smoking-related diseases seems equitable. On the other hand, eligibil-
ity for such health insurance coverage is not dependent on having a se-
rious illness or disability. This fact makes it more likely that much of
the cost would have been incurred even if the persons had never
smoked.How Costly Are Smokers to Other People? 25
To learn more about this issue, it is useful to compare the marginal
effect for the other government category for current plus former one to
four years, 0.030, with the corresponding marginal effect for persons
who quit smoking more than twenty years before Wave 1, 0.011 (see
table 1.4). Relative to private group insurance coverage, the omitted
reference group, the probability of having other government coverage
was much higher for current plus one-to-four-yearformer smokers
than for persons who quit smoking many years ago. We chose this
comparison because the adverse health effects from smoking among
persons who quit more than twenty years earlier wereminimal. This
comparison suggests that, even for other public health insurance
coverage, the onset of adverse health leads to personsseeking
coverage from these sources. But as with Medicare andMedicaid, there
is reason to be cautious because our estimates of burden for the public
payers, though plausibly higher than for private insurers, maybe
somewhat overstated. To the extent that individual health insurers ei-
ther exact a premium surcharge or refuse to cover smokers, it is not
surprising that smoking reduces the probability of having such
coverage.
Our other caveats are more minor. Our cost estimates did not include
the cost of drugs or nursing home admissions. The latter occurrences
are extremely rare for persons in this age group,but nursing home
stays are typically costly. We made no adjustments for technological
change. There have been dramatic decreases in mortality from cardio-
vascular diseases in particular (Cutler and Meara 1998). To the extent
that improvements in treating disease occur, we overestimate the cost
of smoking. These improvements will be offset by secular increases in
the unit cost of care. Also, changes in payment policy are unknown. Of
course, if smoking becomes less costly, perhapsfewer smokers will de-
cide to quit. Further, more youths may start the habit.
We applied only a crude adjustment for the cost of end-of-life care. In
a survey like the Health and Retirement Study, whichobtains data on
the use of health services retrospectively, little information on dece-
dents' use is available. Much more precise estimates of such cost can be
obtained from insurance claims data.
We did not include other nonmedical costs of smoking, such as the
cost of lost productivity and nonpecuniary losses associated with pain
and suffering. Although these losses are important, both from private
and social vantage points, our focus in this study was on medical cost
and the distribution of such cost by source of payment for personal
health services.26 Picone and Sloan
In this study, we examined only smoking's influence on the cost of
medical care during late middle age. Effects may differ appreciably by
age cohort. It is plausible that effects on hospital and nursing home use
are smaller for persons younger than age 51. Mortality effects are
smaller than for persons aged 51 to 67. For persons older than 67, the
effect on use of nursing home care is likely to be considerably larger. To
the extent that there are more nursing home admissions, it will be pos-
sible to obtain more precise estimates of the effect of smoking.
Having acknowledged these caveats, we believe this study has
(1) greatly improved the framework for gauging cost impacts of smok-
ing and (2) established that the burdens of this habit are indeed sub-
stantialinfact,forthisage group, much more substantial
than previous studies have reported. In our analysis, we accounted for
many of the criticisms of past research on smoking cost used by experts
for plaintiffs in tobacco litigation (see, for example, Rubin 1997 for
a critique of such studies). Although smoking clearly is a cause of
poor health, whether tobacco companies caused the damage or the
harm is self-inflicted is a larger question that our study has not
addressed.
Note
This research was supported in part by a grant from the National Institute on Aging to
Duke University entitled "The Private and Social Cost of Smoking" (1RO1-AG-16816).
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